by Yossi Alpher

The decision by PLO/PA leader Mahmoud Abbas to integrate Hamas into Palestinian politics could have far-reaching ramifications for the way Israel addresses political dialogue with the Palestinians.

Hamas is currently defined by Israel, and by much of the world, as a terrorist organization. It has never in any way accepted Israel's right to exist or expressed a readiness to sign a peace treaty ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the other hand, Abbas' approach to Hamas conceivably presents a working model for the peaceful transformation of radical Islamist movements into legitimate political actors within a democratic system. How should Israel react?

Hamas intends to continue participating in Palestinian Authority local elections and to run in national elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in July. Judging by its success in the last round of municipal elections, when it won a majority of the local councils contested in Gaza, and in view of the current disarray within the ranks of Fateh and that organization's corrupt image in the eyes of the Palestinian public, Hamas could register considerable gains in elections and possibly demand to play a role in the next Palestinian Authority government. The election results are also expected to determine the balance of forces between Fateh and Hamas within the PLO, assuming current understandings are maintained and Hamas is brought into that umbrella organization. In the words of Hamas leader Khaled Mishal, we will soon encounter "a PLO in which Fateh no longer has a monopoly".

by Yossi Alpher

The only recorded instance of settler leaders and Palestinian leaders discussing the possibility of settlers remaining on Palestinian territory after Israeli withdrawal, took place ten years ago in talks I organized in Jerusalem. The discussion of the issue is recorded in And the wolf shall dwell with the wolf: the settlers and the Palestinians, a book (in Hebrew) I published four years ago. Some of the statements made then have only now become truly relevant.

Hassan Asfour, chief Palestinian negotiator: "We want a democratic country. The presence of Jews will help us ensure democracy, and will also enable us to serve as a bridge between Israel and the Arab world. As for the settlements per se, they are a consequence of occupation. Where their location doesn't constitute a problem for us, we'll consider the possibility of leaving them in place. But not before a Palestinian state comes into being in Gaza and the West Bank. . . . [A] settler can remain . . . as an individual. . . . "

Khalil Shikaki, leading Palestinian political scientist: "I understand [the settlers'] ideological motivation. But why . . . insist on national sovereignty? I came . . . to see whether I'm correct or not when I assume that ideologically-motivated Jews want to live in the Land of Israel for reasons that transcend politics."

by Yossi Alpher

By and large, Israelis will not mourn Yasser Arafat. But they should take the time now to reflect on how, under his leadership, the Palestinians got where they are--to world recognition, national pride and the brink of statehood, but also to the depths of the present brutal conflict, with its accompanying humiliation and impoverishment. Arafat, after all, bore a great deal of responsibility for both situations. By the same token, his death could precipitate a major move in either direction: toward reconciliation or toward deterioration; toward great opportunity for Palestinians and Israelis, or great turmoil.

Palestine is entering what can be described as a "revolutionary situation". Arafat's death is liable to release a host of power dynamics that were nurtured beneath the surface for years. It is virtually impossible to predict with any certainty who, if anyone, will come out on top. There is no precedent for an orderly transfer of national authority; Arafat himself only succeeded the Palestinian people's first leader, Haj Amin al Husseini, after a power hiatus of 20 years.

In a worst-case scenario parts of Palestine will resemble Somalia, with Hamas ruling most of Gaza, Fatah dissidents controlling the northern West Bank, and the mainstream PLO in Ramallah. In the most optimistic scenario, the Fatah old guard under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Ahmed Qurei (Aba Ala) will consolidate their rule and project stability and moderation.