Akiva Eldar
Israel's excuses are running out
by Akiva Eldar
In the mid-1980s, when the government considered allowing elections in the territories, Henry Kissinger warned an Israeli friend that the territory in which the Palestinian people will elect its leaders will not remain in Israel's hands. Sooner or later, said the professor-statesman, the combination of a people, elections and territory will push Israel back to the 1967 borders. Twenty years and thousands of Israeli and Palestinian victims later, Kissinger's prophecy seems more realistic than ever: The people that dwells in Palestine (and not in the diaspora) elected its leader yesterday. And not only that: Israel is completing the preparations for a departure from all of the Gaza Strip and a small part of the West Bank.
These lines were written a few hours before the results of the elections in the territories became known. However, one can hazard a guess that the Palestinians (including those in East Jerusalem) elected Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as chairman of the Palestinian Authority. Television networks from dozens of countries have broadcast to the world pictures of the lines at the polling stations in Nablus and Hebron, and have reported on the attempts by Hamas to disrupt the democratic process. In between, the correspondents reported on the letters of refusal to serve by reserve officers and on the threats by the Jewish settlers in the territories to revolt when the government of Israel orders - legally - their evacuation from the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank.
The elections in the territories and the disengagement plan have created a certain symmetry between the mainstream on the Israeli side and the mainstream on the Palestinian side. Both here and there, pragmatism is challenging fanaticism and democracy is defending itself from theocracy. Abu Mazen, like Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, will be judged by his ability to realize the will of the majority - the life breath of democracy - giving maximum consideration to a majority that will express its opposition in peaceful ways. The Palestinians' challenge is many times greater: to institute law and order under occupation, in conditions of poverty and despair.
In the mid-1980s, when the government considered allowing elections in the territories, Henry Kissinger warned an Israeli friend that the territory in which the Palestinian people will elect its leaders will not remain in Israel's hands. Sooner or later, said the professor-statesman, the combination of a people, elections and territory will push Israel back to the 1967 borders. Twenty years and thousands of Israeli and Palestinian victims later, Kissinger's prophecy seems more realistic than ever: The people that dwells in Palestine (and not in the diaspora) elected its leader yesterday. And not only that: Israel is completing the preparations for a departure from all of the Gaza Strip and a small part of the West Bank.
These lines were written a few hours before the results of the elections in the territories became known. However, one can hazard a guess that the Palestinians (including those in East Jerusalem) elected Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as chairman of the Palestinian Authority. Television networks from dozens of countries have broadcast to the world pictures of the lines at the polling stations in Nablus and Hebron, and have reported on the attempts by Hamas to disrupt the democratic process. In between, the correspondents reported on the letters of refusal to serve by reserve officers and on the threats by the Jewish settlers in the territories to revolt when the government of Israel orders - legally - their evacuation from the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank.
The elections in the territories and the disengagement plan have created a certain symmetry between the mainstream on the Israeli side and the mainstream on the Palestinian side. Both here and there, pragmatism is challenging fanaticism and democracy is defending itself from theocracy. Abu Mazen, like Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, will be judged by his ability to realize the will of the majority - the life breath of democracy - giving maximum consideration to a majority that will express its opposition in peaceful ways. The Palestinians' challenge is many times greater: to institute law and order under occupation, in conditions of poverty and despair.
Learning all the wrong facts
by Akiva Eldar
Israeli politicians periodically cite Palestinian textbooks as damning proof that the Palestinians are continuing to educate to hatred and not to peace. The last one to do so was Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who called for making the curriculum the acid test of the new Palestinian leadership. The Fatah movement's candidate, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), picked up the gauntlet, but immediately threw one of his own at the Ministry of Education: You want to examine our education for peace? Help yourself, but based on the principle of reciprocity, we should also see what's happening on the Israeli side.
It isn't at all certain that on this test the Israeli education system would get a higher grade than its Palestinian neighbor. Although it is hard to find in Israeli textbooks incidences of blatant incitement, as is often found in Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks, Dr. Ruth Firer of Hebrew University, one of the pioneers of textbook research, argues that the indoctrination in the Israeli books is simply more sophisticated.
For this reason, she says, the messages penetrate all the more effectively. It is harder to detect a stereotype that is concealed by a seemingly innocent icon, she says, than one that is worded such that it "vulgarly pulls you by the nose."
Findings of a study she conducted together with Dr. Sami Adwan of Bethlehem University, who specializes in peace education and human rights, recently appeared in a book published by the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Germany, entitled "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of Both Nations." The study encompassed 13 Israeli textbooks (2,682 pages) and nine Palestinian textbooks (1,207 pages), and revealed a sort of mirror image in which each side pins responsibility for the violence on the other.
Israeli politicians periodically cite Palestinian textbooks as damning proof that the Palestinians are continuing to educate to hatred and not to peace. The last one to do so was Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who called for making the curriculum the acid test of the new Palestinian leadership. The Fatah movement's candidate, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), picked up the gauntlet, but immediately threw one of his own at the Ministry of Education: You want to examine our education for peace? Help yourself, but based on the principle of reciprocity, we should also see what's happening on the Israeli side.
It isn't at all certain that on this test the Israeli education system would get a higher grade than its Palestinian neighbor. Although it is hard to find in Israeli textbooks incidences of blatant incitement, as is often found in Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks, Dr. Ruth Firer of Hebrew University, one of the pioneers of textbook research, argues that the indoctrination in the Israeli books is simply more sophisticated.
For this reason, she says, the messages penetrate all the more effectively. It is harder to detect a stereotype that is concealed by a seemingly innocent icon, she says, than one that is worded such that it "vulgarly pulls you by the nose."
Findings of a study she conducted together with Dr. Sami Adwan of Bethlehem University, who specializes in peace education and human rights, recently appeared in a book published by the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Germany, entitled "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of Both Nations." The study encompassed 13 Israeli textbooks (2,682 pages) and nine Palestinian textbooks (1,207 pages), and revealed a sort of mirror image in which each side pins responsibility for the violence on the other.
Pulling Out - in Jerusalem, Too
by Akiva Eldar
On the Friday when the late Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat was buried in the courtyard of the Muqata, the media reported that because of the fear of riots, the Israeli government had decided to close the Temple Mount mosques to residents of the territories. From this prohibition it could have been understood that on an ordinary holiday, masses of Arabs from Ramallah and from Hebron are allowed to come to Jerusalem to pray at the holy site. And the listener will wonder: If the gates of Jerusalem (which is an Israeli and united city, as we know) are regularly open to the residents of the territories, what are those ugly separation fences that surround East Jerusalem? And, on the contrary: If the capital is wide open, why do the city's Arabs need the permission of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to vote at the polls in Abu Dis?
On the Friday when the late Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat was buried in the courtyard of the Muqata, the media reported that because of the fear of riots, the Israeli government had decided to close the Temple Mount mosques to residents of the territories. From this prohibition it could have been understood that on an ordinary holiday, masses of Arabs from Ramallah and from Hebron are allowed to come to Jerusalem to pray at the holy site. And the listener will wonder: If the gates of Jerusalem (which is an Israeli and united city, as we know) are regularly open to the residents of the territories, what are those ugly separation fences that surround East Jerusalem? And, on the contrary: If the capital is wide open, why do the city's Arabs need the permission of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to vote at the polls in Abu Dis?
Absent presence
by Akiva Eldar
It is said that when Metternich, Austrian chancellor in the 1830s, was informed of the death (in 1838) of the person he hated most, French foreign minister Talleyrand, he commented: "I wonder what he intends." Apparently the debate over whether Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat is a real partner for a two-state solution or a charlatan who has never ceased to aim at the destruction of the State of Israel will not end even after his death.
Even in the Israeli peace camp, those who will shed a tear can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak will not be one of them. As head of Military Intelligence, as chief of staff, as a government minister who participated in the second Camp David summit and as one of the leaders of the Geneva Initiative, he has accumulated scores of hours of observation of the Palestinian leader. Lipkin-Shahak, who was involved up to his neck in the negotiations for the second Oslo agreement, is convinced, on the one hand, that at the end of the 1980s, when the Palestine Liberation Organization adopted the two-state solution, and in the early 1990s, when he signed the Oslo agreements, Arafat was the right person at the right time. Only an authoritative leader like him could have made what looked to many Palestinians like very painful concessions on issues such as territory, Jerusalem and the refugees. On the other hand, Arafat kept in his own hands most of the power and during the past four years made use of it in a way that led to the breakup of Fatah, the increase in terror and a bankrupt leadership.
It is said that when Metternich, Austrian chancellor in the 1830s, was informed of the death (in 1838) of the person he hated most, French foreign minister Talleyrand, he commented: "I wonder what he intends." Apparently the debate over whether Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat is a real partner for a two-state solution or a charlatan who has never ceased to aim at the destruction of the State of Israel will not end even after his death.
Even in the Israeli peace camp, those who will shed a tear can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak will not be one of them. As head of Military Intelligence, as chief of staff, as a government minister who participated in the second Camp David summit and as one of the leaders of the Geneva Initiative, he has accumulated scores of hours of observation of the Palestinian leader. Lipkin-Shahak, who was involved up to his neck in the negotiations for the second Oslo agreement, is convinced, on the one hand, that at the end of the 1980s, when the Palestine Liberation Organization adopted the two-state solution, and in the early 1990s, when he signed the Oslo agreements, Arafat was the right person at the right time. Only an authoritative leader like him could have made what looked to many Palestinians like very painful concessions on issues such as territory, Jerusalem and the refugees. On the other hand, Arafat kept in his own hands most of the power and during the past four years made use of it in a way that led to the breakup of Fatah, the increase in terror and a bankrupt leadership.
