The Most to Gain

by Ferry Biederman

It is tempting to look at developments among the Shi'ite population of Iraq over the last couple of months and paint an optimistic picture for the future of the country. After the guns of August, the holy city of Najaf has remained quiet and the sprawling Baghdad slum of Sadr City also seems to be stabilizing under a weapons buy-back program. The highest spiritual leader of the Shi'ites, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has called on his people to register for the upcoming elections while the young upstart, Moqtada al-Sadr, has reigned in his Mahdi army and is also indicating that he wants to participate in the political process.

But optimistic scenarios for post-US invasion Iraq, mainly by westerners, have been proved wrong too often to accept this rosy picture on face value. The first and most obvious caveat should be that we have seen such a period of seeming stability before, between the battles of April and those of August. The difference is that Sadr's hold over Najaf seems really to have been broken this time and that the Shi'ite religious establishment has come out much more forcefully against him. Recently even Sadr's long-time protector, Grand Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, cut his ties with him.

Sadr probably went too far in his confrontation with the Americans for the comfort of the Shi'ite establishment. Despite all the tensions with the occupation forces, the Shi'ites still stand to gain more than any other group in Iraq from the new order that is taking shape. Where they were persecuted and without much influence under Saddam Hussein and his regime, they now make up the majority in the government and the Interim Council. With estimates of Shi'ites accounting for some 60 per cent of the population against just over 20 per cent for Sunni Arabs and under 20 per cent for Sunni Kurds, they could expect to prevail in the upcoming elections. So it seems if they just sit pretty, the country will fall into their hands without the need for a fight.

Of course things are never that simple. First of all, Sistani has flexed his muscles several times already over exactly what kind of state Iraq will be in the future. The Kurds want to keep their autonomy to the degree that they can just retreat back into their mountainous redoubts should things not go well in the rest of the country. Sistani has come out strongly against such a federal structure. He has also objected to the Shi'ites' electoral strength being diluted too much by reserving quotas for other groups.

The relationship between the different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq will be crucial to the future stability and success of the country. The Sunnis, who have as much to lose from the new arrangements as the Shi'ites have to gain, have to be brought aboard for the system to be viable. The violence in the Sunni areas of the country may preclude widespread participation in the elections that are supposed to be held before the end of January. Sistani is on record as saying the elections should not be postponed and that other countries too have gone to the polls under less than ideal circumstances. This may be true but the danger of the Sunnis feeling even further disenfranchised casts the largest shadow over the optimistic scenario.

Sistani has probably recognized this, and he is said to be the driving force behind attempts to set up a widely touted "unified list" that would include the various Shi'ite movements as well as Kurds and religious Sunnis. Apart from solving some of the questions about Sunni representation, such a list may also be highly desirable to avoid further intra-Shi'ite wrangling. Sadr's uprising against the Americans is seen among many Shi'ites more as a ploy to gain more leverage for himself in the fight for political power than as a real attempt to rid the country of the foreign presence. While he seems to have been successful on the street, he also seems to have caused resentment among the Shi'ite leadership. That is the other shadow over the optimistic scenario: intra-Shi'ite fighting or extremist grand-standing toward the Americans to gain more support.

Then there are of course the Americans themselves and the other coalition partners. Immediately after the war, the Shi'ites were overwhelmingly happy with the US presence. In April 2003, during the first post-Saddam Shi'ite pilgrimage to Karbala emotions ran high, with joyous pilgrims even shouting "thank you Bush, thank you Blair". Most wanted the Americans to stay "until the job is done". But Shi'ite religious leaders were even then sounding dire warnings. Mohammed Ridha Sistani, the Grand Ayatollah's eldest son said presciently: "Iraqis do not want to replace a dictatorship with the rule by a foreign country."

Well, the job is mostly done now; Saddam Hussein and most of his lieutenants are in jail or dead. The Americans have failed to bring security to the country and many Iraqis seem to think they'll be able to do a better job themselves. In order for the Shi'ites to take part in the political process, they need to be reassured about two things: First, that the Americans and their allies will really leave, and secondly that the government that is going to be elected will not just be an American puppet. This means that the Americans have to take a step back from their ambitions in Iraq

- Published 21/10/2004 (c) bitterlemons-international.org. Used here with permission.

Ferry Biederman is the Middle East correspondent for the Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant.