The only course of action

Musa Keilani

The last thing that the interim government in Baghdad and Iraq's neighbours can afford is a confrontation in Iraq among Shiites. And that is precisely what happened in Najaf on Friday.

The problem had been brewing for some time. Moqtada Sadr, the fiery Shiite head of the Mahdi Army militia of young disgruntled Iraqis, had challenged the US military three months ago; then he turned around and said he was going political. He formed a political party and appeared to be turning more to dialogue than the guns. It was then, it seems, that Sadr saw through the political game being played out in the name of the Iraqi national convention to elect a 100-member assembly to guide the interim government towards general elections next year. He realised that it was an orchestrated event whose outcome was predetermined. That is why he announced he was boycotting the convention, which was postponed anyway.

Obviously, his rejection of the convention also means non-acceptance of the interim assembly that the conference is supposed to elect, and that throws a spanner in the American works to attach an image, however blurred that might be, of legitimacy to the superficial transition in Iraq. There are not many Iraqis who see the interim government as legitimate, since it was installed by the US military, the occupation power. Whether there was another way to install Iraqis in power is secondary. For all practical purposes, most Iraqis see the interim government of Iyad Allawi as an agent of the US. It might be the case or it might not, but that is the way the Iraqis see it. Add to that the report that Allawi himself shot and killed six Iraqi insurgents who were detained by his police. Again, the report might or might not be true, but most Iraqis, who are long used to the brutality of the Saddam regime, believe the report to be accurate. That is what matters.

Obviously, the challenge that Sadr put up by boycotting the convention was not acceptable to the US military; hence the course of events to Friday's bitter battles in Najaf.

The Mahdi Army militia overran Najaf and several other small towns from Baghdad to Basra. Allawi's police force and national guard tried to fight back, but then disappeared. That left Allawi with no option but to request the US military to do the job of bringing Sadr to heel for him. Friday's clashes followed. By late Friday, the US military said 300 Sadr men died. Sadr rejected the claim.

It is likely that Allawi might use his new powers to declare a state of emergency in Najaf and other trouble spots and let lose the US military against whoever challenges his authority. If he does that, he is likely to be deprived of whatever control he has over the situation since Iraqis, whether dissidents, insurgents or otherwise, are not going to take it lightly that their interim government is using occupation forces against them. It means more chaos, violence, bloodshed and deepening hostility towards the interim government.

The words that a Sadr loyalist used in Friday sermons were very telling: "I say America is our enemy and the enemy of the people, and we will not accept its partnership.... America is the greatest of Satans."

The interim government described the Sadr camp as thugs who should be driven out of the country. It was the wrong thing to say, at the wrong time, and it has little sense anyway, since Sadr and his men are very much part and parcel of Iraq and has as much right to have a say in the future of the country as anyone else.

Worsening the situation is the absence of the most respected Shiite leader of Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, who was flown to London after he developed cardiac problems. The accuracy of that statement cannot be corroborated. A report that Sistani might have been coerced into permitting himself to be taken to Britain reminds us of the old days when the colonial power used to simply remove "troublesome" and influential leaders from the region to London and pressure them into accepting British terms and conditions. However, if Sistani is genuinely ailing and if he dies in London, heavens forbid, there would be hell to pay in southern Iraq. Neither Allawi's feeble police force nor the US military would be able contain the situation, particularly if Sadr, using his father's name, steps in to exploit the situation.

These are not developments that had been accurately predicted with so many details, but there was warning that only chaos would follow if Iraq were attacked and occupied without drawing up a clear strategy based on the realities on the ground in the country which has a long record of bloodshed and violence.

It might not be too late for the US to act now to save itself. First of all, it should accept that its plans in Iraq have gone terribly wrong and it would be better for it to leave Iraq. Then, it should listen more carefully to the Arab League and the UN and draw up a genuine and sincere plan to hand over Iraq to a combined Arab-UN force that would replace the coalition forces. The UN and the Arab League could take over from there. That is the only safe way out for the US and its allies. They might not realise it now, but soon they would be forced to follow that course of action and by then, their loss would be much greater than it is today.

This article was published in the Sunday, August 8, 2004 edition of the Jordan Times. It is used here with permission.