Is it really new? Is it really a government?

by Jaafar Altaie

Is it really new? "The student has been detained and the teacher has taken over," remarks the owner of one of Baghdad's cafes as he prepares a typical Thursday morning breakfast while watching a news report on the forthcoming trial of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The student in this case is Saddam, and the teacher is America. This saying is a favorite among Baghdad residents when it comes to describing the current state of post-war Iraq.

The new Iraqi government has been heavily influenced by external powers; the limits of its authority and its future agenda are ambiguously defined. The concept of a government comprised of a president, vice president, and prime minister is a classic republican model commonly recognized worldwide. In this regard, there is nothing new about the present government.

What is new in the present government, however, is the caliber of some of its senior leaders. The Iraqi prime minister is a good example. Not only does Ayad Allawi enjoy popular support from ordinary Iraqis, but he also possesses a keen intellect with a thorough grasp of how to reconcile Iraqi and western interests. All signs indicate that this is the right man for the job; many Iraqis believe that this is one of the most capable politicians in Iraq's modern history. The key question, however, is to what extent he will be allowed to apply his immense capabilities and to what extent he will become a victim of poor planning and conflicting interests among the stakeholders in Iraq's government.

In addition to having some senior members of unprecedented caliber, the new government is placing a greater emphasis on human rights and women's rights, at least as far as its ministerial structures are concerned. Whether this is a rhetorical or genuine commitment remains to be seen. What may also be new is the prospect that this government may be successful in solving Iraq's social, economic, and political problems and paving the way for a freely elected government to assume a legitimate role in Iraq's governance.

Its failure to do so would render the government yet another ineffective administration that took power thanks to coercive military influence and maintains power thanks to coercive self-preservation, supported by an extensive state apparatus. For many Iraqis this looks like the same old Iraqi government, except that it has a more sophisticated state apparatus and assured territorial protection due to the support of the world's most powerful armies and security services.

Ultimately, whether this is really a new government or not depends on what actions it takes and how effective it is in solving Iraq's problems. Now that the government has taken power, it will prove whether this is just a government concerned with self-preservation and political rhetoric or whether this is an administration capable of tackling huge problems, most notably in the areas of security, infrastructure, and investments.

The challenges are not new, nor would be the prospect of failure. The possibility of success, however, would be an unprecedented achievement in Iraq and the region. Before considering such an ambitious possibility, however, it is useful to ponder the question of whether the present Iraqi administration can even be referred to as a government, in terms of its real status and authority among ordinary Iraqis and the international community.

Is it really a government? It is an 'infant government,' requiring a great deal of internal and external support to develop into a legitimate and powerful authority. Besides the problems left behind by the prior regime, the new government has to contend with the negative policies and mistakes made by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and security services ensured that the government has extremely limited resources with which to enforce its policies, most notably in the area of security and rule of law. The authority of the CPA also saw economic setbacks in the administration of reconstruction contracts. Many argue that economic opportunities in the various reconstruction programs continue to be unfairly restricted to "friends" of the CPA. Such friends consist of organizations and individuals with direct or indirect links to the US administration. In general, this arrangement has supported an environment of corruption and continues to create antagonism between the haves and have-nots in Iraq's business and economic communities, as ordinary Iraqis compete for shares of lucrative reconstruction contracts.

Whether or not this is a new government depends on its ability to deliver greater stability under increasingly difficult odds. In addition to the problems inherited from the prior regime, the government has to contend with the setbacks experienced by Iraq under the CPA in the areas of security and the administration of reconstruction projects. The government's mission is to ensure a more stable environment in terms of security and a fairer distribution of economic opportunities among ordinary Iraqis. A new government is one that can ensure that Iraq functions as a proper nation; one that can allow ordinary Iraqis to activate Iraq's true potential as a source of progress and stability and to realize sustainable benefits from this. A new government is one that allows Iraq to function as a constructive member of the international community.

-Published 8/7/2004