The honeymoon will not last

by Michael Rubin

On June 28 Iraq formally regained its sovereignty. The departure of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator L. Paul Bremer marked not the beginning of the end, but rather the end of the beginning.

There will be violence in the wake of transfer of sovereignty. Even before moving the ceremony up by two days, CPA security officers had scrapped plans for a lavish hand-off. Fear of roadside bombs forced United States authorities to shuttle dignitaries by helicopter, rather than to bus them, the 18 kilometers between Baghdad International Airport and the Palace. The preemptive ceremony and tacit admission that the US military could not secure 18 kilometers of highway bolstered the confidence of terrorists and insurgents who wish to test both Iraq's new government and US resolve.

In some ways, transfer of sovereignty is anti-climactic. Several hundred US officials remain inside the green zone. There will be no withdrawal of American troops. But military presence and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive: No one questions the sovereignty of Qatar, Korea, Turkey, Italy, or South Korea even though they host US bases.

The US decision to remain inside the Republican Palace, however, is a mistake. Saddam lavishly rebuilt the palace under sanctions, after the 1991 bombing campaign reduced it to rubble. He added huge wings, gardens, and a swimming pool. The palace, visible from across the Tigris River in the crumbling and decrepit Shi'ite Karrada neighborhood, now symbolizes not only Saddam's dictatorship, but occupation as well. The continued closure of the Fourteenth of July Bridge triples the commuting time of Iraqis who once relied on a major thoroughfare connecting two of Baghdad's busiest districts; it is a daily affront to ordinary Baghdadis.

Maintaining a US presence in the palace may buy convenience, but it will not boost effectiveness. In Lebanon, for example, it has been 13 years since the end of the civil war. Beirut is a bustling city sporting fancy boutiques, posh restaurants, and beach resorts. And yet US embassy personnel remain restricted to their compound. If American diplomats cannot function in Beirut, how will they interact with Iraqis in Baghdad?

Iraq's interim government will face many challenges. First and foremost is security. Iraqis will cheer the government on, if effective. After all, the insurgents are unpopular among Iraqis. Any analogy to southern Lebanon falls flat. Targeting Iraqi civilians with car bombs wins neither hearts nor minds.

The political challenges are great. For the past year, Iraqi politicians blamed their ineffectiveness on Bremer who, five days before the inauguration of the Interim Governing Council, announced that he could veto any Governing Council decision. Populist politicians like Da'wa leader Ibrahim Jaafari coupled grandiose promises with explanations that they had not succeeded because of Bremer's veto. Iraqi politicians can no longer play such games.

Iraqis will be impatient with failure on the part of the new government to meet expectations. Unfortunately, the new government will be handicapped. The Governing Council spent the first three months of its existence hashing out internal rules and regulations; with a new structure, the new government will have to repeat the process. Iraqis may want responsive government, but they will get paralysis.

The new government's honeymoon will not last long. There is already grumbling that the United Nations deferred more to outside interests than to Iraqis in the selection of the new government. Iraqis point out Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's close association to the Jordanian royal family. They see President Ghazi al-Yawar as a concession to Saudi interests. Deputy President Jaafari is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Iran. Rowsch Shaways, the other deputy president, is close to Turkey.

United Nations involvement in the new government's selection will not bring lasting legitimacy. Iraqis associate the UN with corruption. Iraqi newspapers like al Mada publish documents exposing bribery of UN officials. Iraqis remember Secretary-General Kofi Annan's quip at a 1998 press conference, "Can I trust Saddam Hussein? Yes, I think I can do business with him." Perception is more important than reality. Saddam, wanting to imply UN endorsement, replayed Annan's statement frequently on Iraqi television. Belief in the UN's effectiveness ended on August 19, 2003, when a truck bomb destroyed the UN's Baghdad headquarters. Rather than persevere, the UN fled. The message to Iraqis was clear: the UN does not have staying power; any UN decision can be negated through violence.

Real legitimacy in Iraq will only come through elections, set to occur by January 31, 2005. Any move to delay elections will result in cynicism and disillusionment. Confidence is already shaken with the decision to move a national conference to select an Interim National Council from Baghdad to Iraqi Kurdistan.

Many issues remain unresolved. Against the recommendation of most Iraqis, Bremer and UN Envoy Carina Perelli have endorsed a party slate system similar to Israel's. Most Iraqis (militant Shi'ite Islamists excepted) prefer a single-member constituency system in which voters choose among candidates for a specific district seat. Accountability breeds moderation. While a party slate election is easier to conduct, it will set Iraq down the slippery slope to Lebanese-style communalism. Party slate elections can also lead to huge numbers of Iraqi towns and villages having no representatives in the national government. And they will make the Iraqi electoral process more vulnerable to an influx of Saudi, Iranian, and Jordanian money. Simply put, it is easier to fund an entire party list than to buy voters in 275 districts.

It is too early either to claim success or mourn Iraq's loss. What is certain is that the United States won a stunning military victory but lost the occupation. The CPA achieved a great deal but nothing that could not have been achieved with an immediate transfer of sovereignty. The last battle, the one for a representative, democratic government, has yet to be decided. Iraqis are much more resilient than outside politicians and pundits believe. They have no desire to revert to dictatorship. I have faith they will succeed.

-Published 8/7/2004