Damascus is Ready to Talk. Are We?
by Peter Ryan
In a recent interview with John Simpson of the BBC, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad indicated again that he was open to a negotiated peace settlement with Israel, though he expressed skepticism that either Israel or the U.S. was ready to renew talks. "You say in English 'it take two to tango,'" President Assad told the reporter. In an interview with Spain's El Pais newspaper, Assad indicated that he believed that a peace settlement could be achieved within as little as six months if negotiations were to resume where they had last left off.
The response to Assad's gestures from Tel Aviv and Washington, D.C. has been to ignore or, worse, dismiss the possibility of a new round of talks. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert essentially shut off the possibility of talks by announcing that there would be no negotiations over the status of the Golan Heights while he was in power. The Western media, with all eyes turned toward North Korea, Iraq and Iran, has also paid scant attention to Assad's gestures. Whatever one ultimately feels about the regime in Damascus, ignoring any opportunity for peace would be an enormous mistake. Israel, the United States and Syria all have a great deal to gain from renewed talks and absolutely nothing to gain from silence.
Warmer relations with Syria could help the U.S. and Iraqi forces in their efforts to defeat the Sunni contingent of the insurgency in Iraq. In the long-run, it could help ensure that Syria doesn't opt for the Iranian strategy of pursuing nuclear technology, in part as a means of intimidating external threats, such as the United States (while Syria is unlikely to announce any such plans, surely the countries of the world are beginning to notice that the "squeaky wheel gets the grease" when it comes to nuclear proliferation, with North Korea and Iran sucking up most of the U.S.'s diplomatic attention).
Any weakening in the relations between Syria and Hezbollah or Syria and Iran could give both the U.S. and Israel more leverage in dealing with the dual issues of international terrorism and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Simply put: a Western-friendly Syria could be very helpful, while an antagonistic Syria could do enormous harm.
And many analysts believe that the best way, in the long-run, to "democratize" an undemocratic nation is to increase, rather than decrease, it's relations with the outside world, especially its trade relations. Opening a country's doors brings in new ideas and new businesses, which, though certainly not a guarantee of democratic reform, makes such reforms increasingly possible. Closing the doors on a country through economic sanctions, as we learned from our experience in Iraq, can actually serve to tighten the grip of a dictatorship over its populace, strengthening the regime while simultaneously impoverishing ordinary Iraqis.
Syria was never mentioned on President Bush's "axis of evil" list but, odds are, Assad's regime qualified as a "runner up." Some reports have even indicated that certain elements in the Bush White House (such as Cheney) wanted to encourage Israel to expand its recent offensive against Hezbollah by simultaneously attacking Syria, a provocation which could have led to full scale war (and may have even drawn Iran into the fray). Bashar al-Assad, no doubt, feels deeply threatened by these gestures. If the U.S. can overthrow the Iraqi government, what's to stop them from pursuing "regime change" in Syria? Warmer relations with Israel and the U.S. would ease the strategic threat. Because negotiations would likely lead to a return of all or most of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, a peace deal would be likely seen as a domestic political victory for Assad as well.
What does all this add up to? Well, it should be clear that a "win-win" solution to this conflict is at least conceivable. I think we can be cautiously optimistic that negotiations, if initiated, might actually reach a conclusion acceptable to both sides.
With so much to gain and so little to lose on all sides, our current silence on the subject is absurd. As President Bush is fond of saying "the stakes" in the Middle East "are high." Ignoring Syria' call for peace is a bad bet. The United States and Israel may feel they have good reasons to be skeptical of Assad's gestures toward peace. But the fact that negotiations might fail or Assad's position may harden is no reason to give up before the game has even started. U.S. and Israeli leaders also, no doubt, have many reasons to resent Syria, a country they suspect of a wide range of malicious behaviors, including turning a blind-eye to insurgents that cross their border to enter Iraq, their support of Hezbollah and their suspected involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Certainly, the Syrian government is no pillar of freedom and human rights. But peace is not made between friends, it's made between enemies. One need not love Syria to engage it.
Some argue that Assad's calls for peace are just a ploy, an attempt to distract the world's attention away from a soon-to-be-released report on the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Fine, if Assad is asking for negotiations under false pretenses then call his bluff. Otherwise he'll be able to position himself firmly on a plausible (though illusory) "moral high-ground." He'll be able to tell the world: "See, I asked for peace and Israel and America refused to consider it. They will not even talk, much less negotiate. What does that tell you about their intentions?"
Syria, of course, can and should do more to seek peace. Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres has suggested that Bashar al-Assad announce that he will be coming to address the Israeli Knesset, just as Egyptian president Anwar Sadat did before beginning negotiations with Israel because, if he made such a dramatic gesture, "Who would stop him?". It would make a lot of sense for Assad to follow this advice. His government arguably has the most to lose if relations become even further strained. But Israel and the U.S. shouldn't wait for Syria to make all the right moves, they should indicate a willingness to talk. They should begin opening doors, rather than closing them.
Negotiations with Syria will likely be unpopular in both Israel and the United States where frank but respectful talks with any Middle Eastern country (except for Israel and Saudi Arabia) is seen as "soft" in the current political climate. But if relations with Damascus do not get much better they are bound to get much worse. Ten years from now, we may scratch our heads and wonder why we were not eager to snatch up peace negotiations with Assad when they were handed to us on a silver platter. What were we thinking? This is a question we frequently ask about our Middle East policies – but always too-little too-late.
Let's not wait for another war before we start demanding that our government make peace.
Related Resources:
Transcript of President Assad BBC Interview at Sana.org
Article: Between Syria and Israel, a strategic breakthrough for peace is possible

