by Sadegh Zibakalam

The conflict between Iran and the United States is as old as the Islamic regime itself. But never during the past 27 years has the intensity of hostilities between the two states been so high. Even at the peak of the war with Iraq, and given that Iranians broadly blamed the US for persuading Iraq to attack Iran, animosity between the two countries was not as high as it is today.

Many Iranians wonder anxiously whether the US will launch a military invasion against Iran. Some are convinced that the US is contemplating an air strike against Iran's nuclear sites. On the eve of the so-called 5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) gathering in Moscow on April 17 and 18, the price of gold jumped rapidly in Iran. Although the government intervened and the price eventually came down, the price of a standard Iranian gold coin rose two-fold at the peak of the panic.

What has elevated animosity between the two states to an unprecedented level is Iran's nuclear program. The positions of the two adversaries over the issue are clear and leave no room for compromise. Iran believes in its solemn and ineluctable right under international treaties, including the NPT, to develop its "peaceful" nuclear program. Allowing for some minor mistakes and past negligence that are tantamount to no more than misdemeanors, the Iranian authorities insist that all of the country's nuclear activities have conformed with the rules and regulations of the international watch-dog body, the IAEA. They refer to reports compiled by IAEA inspectors who have visited every site in which Iran carried out some sort of nuclear activity as well as military installations not involved in any nuclear activity. None of the reports produced any evidence that Iran is developing atomic weapons.

While not disputing Iran's right to develop its nuclear industry, the US holds that the Islamic regime's past record as well as some of its present behavior give rise to serious concern about the ultimate objective of its nuclear program. Iran basically says, "take my word for it that I have no intention of developing an atomic bomb and I only intend to enrich uranium to a low degree sufficient to produce fuel for my present and future nuclear reactors." The US rejects Iran's word. The European Union has increasingly adopted the US position, while Russia and China have tried to play the role of honest broker. On the whole, Iran has found itself increasingly isolated and is losing the battle for international public opinion to the western countries.

Apart from deepening hostility with the US, the nuclear issue has confronted Iran with its most serious international crisis since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In many ways, the nuclear issue has presented Iranian leaders with a far more complex problem than the eight-year war with Iraq. The Iranian leadership was more or less united over the war with Iraq; this is not the case regarding the nuclear issue.

Ostensibly, Iranians have managed to present a unified front over the country's nuclear program. The left, reformists, pragmatists, conservatives and hardliners have all defended Iran's rights to develop its nuclear potential. Beneath the unified front, however, there are disagreements. The main disagreement is twofold: how to continue the country's nuclear program, and how to address the international community, particularly the US, regarding its nuclear program.

The more pragmatic Iranian leaders, headed by ex-president Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, while in principle supporting continuation of the program, believe that Iran must refrain from antagonizing the West, particularly the US, over its nuclear activities. They are more inclined to reach a deal worked out by the three leading EU countries, the UK, France and Germany, rather than relying on Russian and Chinese support in the Security Council. They believe that the extent of trade and economic ties these two countries have with the US and the EU is critical; confronted with serious pressure from the US, both Russia and China might withdraw their support for Iran and leave the Islamic regime in the cold. Meanwhile, Iran has to provide both countries with lucrative deals to compensate for their support.

The deal with the EU may not initially offer Iran a great deal. But in the long run, by convincing the Europeans that Iran is serious in not wishing to develop nuclear weapons, we can benefit a great deal more than by relying on Russia and China. Moreover the EU, particularly the UK, has far more leverage over Washington than do Russia and China together.

This was broadly the strategy employed by the previous Iranian negotiating team, headed by Dr.Hasan Ruhani, one of Rafsanjani's lieutenants. In trying to reduce US fears regarding Iran's nuclear program, the pragmatists are also inclined to halt uranium enrichment on an industrial scale for up to five years and to carry out enrichment on a laboratory scale under international supervision. In return for an open and limited-scale program, Iran would expect to receive western know-how for its nuclear program and, more importantly, much needed western investment in the country's energy industry. In short, the more moderate Iranian leaders prefer a more conciliatory approach.

In contrast to the moderates, the hardliners, headed by newly-elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, advocate a more hawkish approach to the country's nuclear program. Initially, Ahmadinezhad's disapproval of the way the Iranian team had been negotiating with the western powers was implicit, but he soon began criticizing the ex-negotiators very openly. Ruhani and his colleagues initially showed constraint and did not respond to Ahmadinezhad's criticisms; eventually however, they lost patience and replied.

They defended their tactics throughout the two years of negotiating with the EU3, including the two year voluntary freeze on the country's enrichment program. The moderates further criticized Ahmadinezhad's comments about Israel and the Holocaust. One reformist newspaper even went so far as to blame Ahmadinezhad for trying deliberately to provoke the US over the country's nuclear program. Without naming the president, the newspaper wrote, "it appears that some of our leaders are trying to use the country's nuclear issue as a tool to score points against the Great Satan. While every effort ought to be undertaken to alleviate US fears about our nuclear program, some of our leaders are in fact behaving in exactly the opposite direction". Ahmadinezhad eventually replaced Ruhani with Ali Larijani.

The future of American-Iranian relations concerning Iran's nuclear program depends in part on the outcome of the quiet struggle that is unfolding between hardliners and moderates within the Iranian leadership.

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- Published 27/4/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Sadegh Zibakalam is associate professor of political science at Tehran University.