by Jonathan Power

How is the ordinary mortal able to make up his mind on whether Iran is developing nuclear weapons or not, and if so whether this poses a serious threat to Israel or other neighbours? After all, as Hans Blix, the UN's former chief nuclear weapons inspector, famously said about Iraq's supposed nuclear armoury, there was nothing to stop Saddam Hussein hanging up a sign "Beware of the dog", even if there was no dog.

Moreover, even if Iran does have, or almost have, the capability to build a few nuclear weapons, who would it use them against in a real-life situation, as opposed to the make-believe scenarios that game playing strategists love to create? Against Israel, Europe or the US? These putative antagonists all have enough submarines, hardened silos and nuclear missiles to ensure a second strike ability that would wipe Iran off the face of the planet.

Common sense suggests we should get on with our jobs, rearing our families and reading some good novels to take our mind off the situation, and forget about it. Alas, this is not how the world ticks. Some of its best minds, both in Iran and outside, are engaged in a do or die struggle to outwit the other on the subtleties of these questions. Not least, political passions are not as rational as some of us would like to think.

Iran has become the pivot of Washington's attentions and not North Korea for one very good reason: North Korea's foreign policy is next to passive whilst Iran's is actively anti-Israel. Unsurprisingly, the number of important voices in Israel and the US who argue for preventive strikes against Iran's nuclear installations has grown significantly the last twelve months. Even though many thoughtful analysts accept that Iran's original motive for wanting nuclear weapons is defensive and was probably triggered in the first place by Iraq's supposed capabilities, Iranian self-justification has slid easily into the perceived need to deter the US with its 25-year economic crusade against Iran.

But just as the priorities have changed from Iraq to the US, so can they change again - in Israel's direction. Even if popular pressure one day modifies the Iranian government's internal rigidity, actual possession of nuclear weapons will inevitably embolden its foreign policy and thus act as an influence on Israel's Arab neighbours to be less accommodating. Moreover, it will probably persuade Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria to become nuclear weapon states themselves.

Ephraim Kam, of the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, has recently written that Israel, unlike with its attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, this time cannot attack Iran alone. It must be a combined operation with the US, not least because of the American and British presence on the ground in the region and the danger of an inadvertent clash with their forces on the one hand and the danger of Iranian retaliation against these forces on the other. Even then, he argues, the chances of total success, given Iran's ability to hide deep underground much of its nuclear industry, and given the widespread support its government has across the domestic political spectrum on this issue, it will be next to impossible to squelch once and for all the Iranian nuclear quest.

Still, as George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment reports, quoting an Israeli official, "if you cannot absolutely live with something, then you have to act. The consequences may be horrible, but they will come later. The consequences of not acting are intolerable immediately, so you have to act and live another day to deal with what comes next".

As the clocks tick towards midnight, it is not surprising that, belatedly, Washington has indicated that it is behind the European Union's efforts to persuade Iran to forgo the nuclear weapons option, using carrots more than sticks. (Even President George W. Bush can see the complexities of an attack on Iran.)

One wishes the joint effort well. But it is reasonable to wonder if it will have much effect unless the Arab states and Israel also join this cause. Now that Saddam is defeated, Israel must seriously consider foregoing its nuclear weapons as part of a grand bargain with Iran. And the other Arab states, which are covertly developing the possibility of going nuclear, must open up and renounce the effort, as Libya recently did.

That is a big apple to bite and will demand some ingenious, combined Western diplomacy. But present-day piecemeal bites come up against a hard core of intractable problems - and the very real danger that Israel, feeling time is working against it, may lash out with its own attack, and damn the consequences.

This article was published in the Friday-Saturday, March 11-12, 2005 edition of the Jordan Times. It is used here with permission.