Iran's Upcoming Elections Up for Grabs

by Siamak Namazi

From: MERIP (used w/permission)

So confident are Iranian conservatives three months before the country's

February 20, 2004 parliamentary elections that, in the words of one

right-wing strategist, they have stopped talking about how to beat reformist

candidates and begun to plan "how to run the nation." Conservatives believe

that victory next February will precede an even larger triumph in the

presidential election of 2005.

Their optimism, which finds glum echoes in

Western analysts' predictions of a conservative takeover, is misplaced. It

is too soon to call the outcome of the February vote, and too soon to

conclude, as Washington hawks may have done, that Iranians' hopes for

peaceable reforms are doomed.

Iranian voters have shocked the pundits before, notably when they delivered

a landslide for President Mohammad Khatami in 1997. Back then, it was taken

for granted that Khatami's conservative opponent, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, the

favored candidate of the regime, was a shoo-in for the post. Four years

later, even Khatami's campaign managers were surprised when 22 million

Iranians -- turning out in numbers far exceeding predictions -- gave him an

overwhelming second popular mandate.

The prognosticators' crystal balls proved foggy before the February 2003

nationwide municipal elections as well. While most expected a serious drop

in voter turnout, almost no one imagined that so few (10 to 15 percent of

eligible voters) would exercise their franchise in the major cities. Fewer

still, not even the conservatives, dreamed that the reformists would be

swept out of their seats on city councils, including in the capital, Tehran.

As that election day drew near, a hard-line conservative daily ran a cartoon

showing hoof marks leading to the city council building -- in mockery of the

politicians they expected to be running it. But, for many reasons, it is

premature to bandy about the results of these local council elections,

considered proof of Iranians' declining faith in voting, as the model for

the upcoming parliamentary elections.

PAST PATTERNS, PRESENT QUESTIONS

In the years since the 1979 revolution, Iranians have gone to the polls in

large numbers. The lowest turnout in a parliamentary contest, elections for

the First Majles (Assembly) in 1980, was 52 percent. During the last

parliamentary elections in 2000, a time when hope for change ran high,

approximately 70 percent of voters took part. The presidential race of 1997

brought out even bigger chunks of the electorate.

First-ever local council elections in 1999 attracted 60 percent of eligible

voters. But the 10 percent discrepancy between this rate and the next year's

parliamentary turnout is generally attributed to the disdain of some

conservatives for the local councils as a reformist project and, perhaps

even more, to the greater importance of parliamentary elections. Even in the

local council elections of February 2003, close to half of the electorate

cast a ballot on a national basis. It was in the major cities (which make up

a quarter of the total population) where participation was alarmingly low.

Only 11 percent of eligible voters showed up in Tehran, with slightly larger

percentages voting in other cities, helping the conservative candidates to

win. Outside urban areas, however, reformists maintained a majority in local

councils, though they often lost seats. Might the low urban turnout presage

a new, long-term national trend?

Past patterns show that people in the provinces vote in accordance with

personal, ethnic, tribal and family affiliations. In Majles elections,

provincial voters also want to send powerful local representatives to the

capital to lobby the central bureaucracy for resources. In the past, these

factors boosted national turnout at times when participation in major cities

was low. But as seasoned social scientists have pointed out, residents of

provincial areas also tend to emulate the behavior of people in larger

cities, especially Tehran. It appears that at least some residents of

smaller cities were surprised that Tehranis boycotted the local council

elections to such a large extent. At this point, it is unclear which of

these tendencies will play a greater role in the coming Majles elections.

Will provincial voters continue to come to the polls to make sure their

local interests are addressed in the capital, or will many of them choose to

copy Tehrani abstention from voting?

Adding to the unpredictability, Iran boasts one of the youngest populations

in the world, with roughly two thirds (and counting) of its people under 30,

as well as one of the lowest voting ages. Men and women aged 16 and over are

allowed to take part in national elections. Every year, the preferences of

younger Iranians become more and more instrumental in determining the

overall results. The young flocked to voice their preferences in the two

presidential elections of 1997 and 2001, as well as in the 2000

parliamentary elections, when they helped to ensure the reformist bloc's

margin of victory. But there are no surveys that predict how Iranian youth

would vote, or even if they will vote, come February 2004.

On the other side of the argument, some analysts maintain that the low

turnout in the local council elections is due mainly to voter

disillusionment with those institutions' poor performance in major cities.

Proponents of this theory are hopeful that Iranians feel differently about

the parliament's performance. While they expect a part of the population to

drop out -- mainly those who generally did not take part in national

elections until they found hope in the person of Khatami and his reformist

supporters -- they are confident that the bulk of those who voted before

1997 will show up next February. Turnout, however, is not the only

uncertainty for the parliamentary reformists.

THE REFORM CAMP'S CHALLENGE

Four years after the peak of their energy in advance of the 2000 Majles

elections, the reformists find themselves on the defensive. They are trying

to withstand the attack of the conservatives while battling growing dissent

within their own coalition and popular disappointment with their lack of

achievements to date. The Second of Khordad Front -- as the reformist bloc

in Parliament is known -- is definitely not as unified as it was in 2000.

Internal disagreements about the scope of reforms and how strongly and

radically to stand against the onslaught of the conservatives have played a

big part in bringing about the divisions. If the reformists have not

articulated a clear strategy in the current campaign, this may be why.

But the reformers also learned during previous campaigns that broadcasting

their strategy loud and clear for their opponents to hear is not wise.

During the 2000 race, the conservative Guardian Council -- an unelected body

that has the power, under the Iranian constitution, to block bills passed by

the Majles -- threatened to subject the majority of reformist candidates to

an ideological vetting process. The reformists retorted that they would

flood the ballots with hundreds of candidates, so that no matter how many

were disqualified by the Council, the voter would still have plenty of

choices to pick from. Thus forewarned, the Council did the opposite of what

they had promised, rejecting very few reformist candidates, hoping that the

abundance of choice would split the vote.

More importantly, the reformists are increasingly concerned about

conservative surveillance of their strategy sessions. Mohammad Reza Khatami,

leader of the reformist party Mosharekat and the president's brother, was

quoted in the Iran newspaper saying that "we see among ourselves that all of

our meeting rooms are bugged and all of our members are followed... This

situation necessitates that we do not announce all that we want to do in

advance." Despite the secrecy, the main components of the reformists'

strategy are easily identifiable in their speeches and articles. Perhaps

their greatest achievement has been to convince many within the conservative

camp that the fate of the regime is bound up with attendance at the polls

next February.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DEBATE

The syllogism the reformists have used is not hard to understand. The hawks

in Washington and Tel Aviv, they argue, believe that the Islamic Republic of

Iran is a house of cards. Iranians are so frustrated with the regime, the

hawks calculate, that, with a bit of encouragement, they will rise up and

dispose of clerical rule. Hence, the "external enemy" can be expected to

continue exerting pressure to keep the regime on a crisis footing, while

sending messages of support for the Iranian people's fight for freedom and

democracy. But if voter turnout in 2004 and 2005 is high, the reformists'

logic continues, the Washington hawks are bound to be discredited, and the

White House will be more likely to adjust its stance toward engagement and

dialogue.

The reformists' political opponents, therefore, face a challenge in deciding

where their best interest lies. A dramatic fall in voter turnout will favor

the conservatives' electoral chances; the last local council elections

proved that they can count on their supporters to show up, while the

reformist voters stay home. Nevertheless, editorials in the major

conservative papers and comments by politicians affiliated with that camp

show that the reformists have succeeded in convincing a number of key

players of their viewpoint.

Taha Hashemi, an editor of the moderate conservative paper Entekhab, thought

to be close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, puts it this way: "If

the world faces a regime whose most important election -- the parliamentary

elections -- has little public backing, it will make all efforts to settle

its scores with that regime." He continues: "Some incorrectly believe that

appeasing America and expediting discussions whose outcome is not known

could save us from this situation. But this is wishful thinking because [the

Americans] will not talk to us from an equal position based on respect."

Khamenei's own statement in October is the best evidence for the reformists'

success in emphasizing the importance of mass participation. "What is

important to me in the first place is the people's presence in the

elections," he said, adding, "who makes it to the parliament is in second

place."

THE EXTENT OF VETTING

Perhaps less successfully, the reformists have gone on to contend that

voters will turn out if the elections are free and fair, an attempt to

convince the Guardian Council not to vet their candidates en masse. This is

a tough sell. After Khatami came to power in 1997, many conservatives

regretted having allowed him to run in the first place. When it came time

for the 2000 Majles elections, once again some right-wing strategists were

upset that their camp had barred the candidacies of a mere 8 percent of

those who wanted to run. The expectation is that the conservatives will not

repeat this "mistake" come February, particularly since low levels of

vetting would not guarantee an increased turnout. Conservatives may recall

that local council elections in February 2003 were described as the "freest

ever" nationwide vote in Iran. Candidates from "outsider" and dissident

groups, including the national-religious supporters, were allowed to try

their luck. But they were not successful in winning seats, or in enticing

large numbers of Iranians to the voting booth.

The reformists reply that while people stayed home when vetting was at a

minimum, they may be further discouraged if the conservatives block more

candidates from entering the races. Despite these reformist efforts at

persuasion, the Guardian Council and the reformist-controlled Interior

Ministry are already sparring over their respective spheres of authority

over candidacy, before formal campaigning has even started.

RE-FORMING THE REFORMIST BLOC

Expanding rifts among the 18 political groups and factions that comprise the

reformist bloc pose another major challenge to leaders trying to craft a

unified strategy in advance of the upcoming elections. Three main voices are

audible. "Radicals," such as the Participation Front and the Islamic

Revolution Mojahedin Organization, have threatened to boycott the elections,

loath to appear stymied by the conservatives before their constituents.

"Moderates," led by the main clerical reformist faction -- Majma'

Rohaniyoun-e Mobarez (MRM), which includes Majles Speaker Mehdi Karrubi and

President Khatami -- have advocated reasoning with the right to get the best

deal possible. Finally, "right of center" groups, mainly the Executives of

Construction, are pondering a break with the reformists, in favor of either

independence or coalition with moderate conservative factions. Meanwhile,

student associations, who appear disillusioned with the reformist front and

tired of being labeled too radical, are threatening to abstain from voting

entirely.

For their part, the conservatives are doing their best to widen the chasm

among the reformists. At the peak of the debate between the radical and more

conciliatory reformist groups in the early autumn of 2003, right-wing

newspapers spread a rumor that the MRM is contemplating a new coalition with

its conservative clerical counterparts. The conservatives are apparently

also trying to tempt the Executives of Construction to switch sides.

Yet, as February 20, 2004 draws closer, it appears that many reformists are

putting their differences on hold. Khatami and Karrubi convened a series of

joint meetings with members of the Second of Khordad Front, with the

president promising to endorse a joint slate of candidates if his supporters

could produce one. The more radical reformers, meanwhile, concluded that,

despite structural obstacles to their agenda, they must remain in control of

major institutions such as Parliament. "After much debate, that [consensus]

even included peripheral groups," explained a member of the Mosharekat

faction. "We kept playing out the scenarios, and realized that, although it

is a choice between bad and worse, staying in the scene is the better

option. Even if we cannot change things at the pace that the people want, we

can at least parry some of the blows of the hardliners, and keep inching

forward towards reforms."

Despite this tendency toward conciliation, the reformists are holding in

reserve a number of wild cards should their rivals take things too far.

There are rumors, for example, that President Khatami might request that the

presidential elections be held a year early, to coincide with the Majles

elections. Such a drastic move, which would be tantamount to resignation, is

unlikely given the moderate cleric's past behavior. But if implemented, it

would create a substantially different atmosphere for the February 2004

vote.

PAST MISTAKES, PRESENT OPTIONS

With the "stay or quit" debate largely over, the reformists are focusing

their attention on how to induce the Iranian people to come out and vote for

them. They say they have learned from past mistakes, and that their days of

taking voters for granted are over. As prominent reformist MP Fatemeh Rakaei

put it, "One of the reasons for the loss in the [February 2003] councils

elections goes back to ourselves, since we thought people would participate

and the reformists would get votes. Since we were very confident about this,

we did not...invest in the elections in the way that was necessary." Former

deputy interior minister Mostafa Tajzadeh, who was forced out of office

after standing firm against the Guardian Council's vetting authority in

previous elections, added that, "our problem in this round in not

disqualification.... Our worry is about people's participation, particularly

in big cities."

To drum up support, the reform camp is trying to reestablish lost ties with

other groups, mainly university students and national-religious figures. The

recent "political fast" movement -- wherein major reformist figures fasted

in support of political prisoners -- represents one aspect of this strategy.

The fasts, which started before Ramadan and extended throughout the Muslim

holy month, were often held at universities, where a star-studded cast of

reformist leaders delivered political speeches after the breaking of the

fast at sunset.

Second, the reformist leaders admonish prospective voters that boycotting

the elections can only result in a conservative resurgence, hence risking a

return to the more closed public space of the pre-Khatami days. The

reformists point to the program of Tehran's new hard-line mayor, Mahmud

Ahmadinejad, who has cracked down on the formerly liberal granting of

concert licenses and apparently plans to close down many cultural centers in

favor of Qur'an recitation halls. The people's choice, like that of the more

radical reformers, might be between bad and worse, but keeping the reformist

faction in power at least offers limited hope and requires minimum energy:

simply turn out and vote.

The message itself could be an effective one, particularly if councils in

conservative-controlled cities persist in implementing policies that are

unpopular with the youth. Nevertheless, the reformists have not always

framed this argument in an appealing manner. Reformist MP Behrouz Afkhami,

for example, recently claimed that Tehranis deserve their hard-line mayor

because they were "too lazy" to vote. As one Tehran resident commented,

"While I understand the argument, and frankly I am undecided whether or not

to vote at all in February, if another reformist speaks like that again, I

can assure you there is no way I would vote for them. I would just stay

home."

UP FOR GRABS

On the other side, the conservatives are doing more than talking like

winners. Expecting a higher turnout and hence a tougher race outside the

major cities, the conservatives are discussing the option of fielding their

more prominent, "brand-name" candidates in the provincial areas. In larger

cities, the right wing will likely rely on new faces promising to

concentrate on issues affecting the day-to-day lives of voters, such as job

creation and the nation's worn-out infrastructure, rather than esoteric

notions of democracy and freedom of speech.

There are also rumors that military leaders affiliated with the right-wing

faction will enter their names in the Majles elections. Perhaps the

conservatives believe that Iranians will view military men as strong,

disciplined politicians who can cut through bureaucratic red tape. The

reformists are crying foul, reminding their opponents that the constitution

expressly bans the presence of the military in politics. Of course, a

commander who quits his post by a certain date is legally allowed to run.

But, warn the reformists, such a commander might instruct subordinates to

transport his former troops to the polls -- giving himself a built-in

electoral advantage.

The forthcoming parliamentary elections, in short, are up for grabs. Plenty

of evidence indicates that Iranians are frustrated with the inability of the

reform movement to overcome conservative stonewalling; indeed, this is a

major reason why voter participation plummeted in 2003. If recent voting

patterns hold, in February 2004 the conservatives might be able to secure

most seats in about ten major cities. Still, the reformists have a fair

chance of winning a majority of seats in the rest of Iran. The Seventh

Majles could therefore be more pluralistic, with more factions represented

and more independent MPs, but the reformist bloc would retain its voice in

the legislature. Yet the addition of millions of newly eligible voters each

year and the tendency for Tehran to be a model of behavior for other parts

of the nation are enough to cast doubt on the reliability of previous

elections as an indicator of future results.

Meanwhile, although a heated factional fight continues, the state as a whole

has concluded that its security is tied to its ability to attract citizens

to the voting booth. Each camp is devising a strategy to take over the next

parliament through analyzing their past successes and failures, but the

Iranian voter remains elusive and hard to predict.

(Siamak Namazi is the managing director of Atieh Bahar Consulting, based in

Tehran.)