A Turkish perspective

by Ersin Kalaycioglu

President George W. Bush's first four years made a big impact on the Middle East. The war and invasion of Iraq by the US-led "coalition of the willing" changed the political geography of the region. For many decades, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline has been a major oil transport route. The Euphrates and Tigris rivers originate fully or partially in Turkey and constitute the major source of water supply for both Syria and Iraq. Consequently, the affairs of Iraq and Syria influence Turkey, and vice versa. Now, long-time allies Turkey and the United States have become neighbors. Iraqi developments have provided business opportunities--jobs for Turkish companies and workers--yet risks and hazards as well. Indeed, those who ventured south from Turkey to earn a living met with hostility; some were abducted, others lost their lives.

Since the end of the Iraq war of 2003, the Bush administration has been committed to a policy of establishing political democracy in Iraq. Now, through popular elections due for January 30, 2005, a new Iraqi government with democratic credentials is to emerge. The US-led forces have moved to mop up armed resistance and establish political calm prior to the elections. If all goes according to plan, a popularly elected, legitimate democratic government will emerge to rule the country some time in the distant future. However, the road to the long-term objective of Iraqi democratic self-government seems to be full of uncertainties and perils.

The US military campaign against the Iraqi resistance was overwhelming at the Iraqi city of Fallujah, resulting in many thousands of casualties of young male Sunni Iraqis who were presumed to be involved in the resistance. The true scale of casualties suffered by the "innocent civilians" in Fallujah is yet unknown, though it has prompted hatred toward President Bush and the US among the Sunnis in and around Iraq. It is also uncertain whether political calm can be established in Iraq through military might. It seems as if the military campaign has not led to any termination of attacks on US troops and their foreign and Iraqi allies.

The success of the US policy of mixing American bullets with Iraqi ballots is far from certain. It looks as if the Shi'ite community of Iraq is poised to win the elections (if they can unite around a single party); the Sunnis, being divided into Arabs and Kurds, do not have the size or the solidarity to withstand the Shi'ite electoral challenge. There has been a long history of Sunni rule in Iraq, and it will not be easy for them to accept the poll results imposed upon them.

There is also a huge bounty at stake in Iraq: whoever controls the state controls Iraqi oil revenues, an emolument to be distributed as patronage. Will the new Shi'ite "democratic" rulers of Iraq be eager to share that wealth with the rest of the Sunni Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian, Nestorian, etc., population? It is hard to imagine an affirmative answer.

There seem to be four basic perils at the start of the road to democracy in Iraq. The first possibility is that those who sense defeat at the polls will boycott the elections, and continue to resist them in any way they can. The second possibility is that the elections will take place with mass participation, yet the losers will contest the results and continue to resist the new government anyhow. Under both circumstances the central government will depend upon US might to establish its authority over Iraq's territory, and will risk being considered as the new American stooge. Thirdly, the new "democratic Shi'ite" government of Iraq may consider developing close relations with neighboring Shi'ite Iran and the Alawite regime in Syria (with its close historical links to Shi'a Islam), which will disturb the delicate balances of the region. Finally, if the Kurds feel sufficiently disenfranchised, they would be tempted to break away. As regional tension mounts and the conflict spreads, the US will come under pressure from Turkey, members of the Arab League, and Iran not to renege upon its commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq.

The Middle Eastern policies of the new Bush administration also contain uncertainties vis-a-vis Israel and Palestine. It is not clear whether the new administration of President Bush is at all eager to breathe life into the peace process there. The death of Yasser Arafat and the changes at the top of the Palestinian Authority also add to the looming uncertainties, as does the plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's government in Israel to pull out of Gaza: it seems neither to please the Palestinians nor the settlers and the Israeli supporters of Sharon's party. The raucous politics of Palestine and the tense relations with Israel seem to be too institutionalized to change in the short run. It is still uncertain whether the new Bush administration has any innovative solutions on those issues up its sleeve.

The Turkish authorities welcomed President Bush's re-election in the sense that he is "the devil they know". However, they are cognizant of the risks of ominous developments in the Middle East. In addition to the dangers noted above, there are possibilities of terror campaigns challenging the Saudi, Moroccan, and other regimes that seek political legitimacy through Islam. All such menacing developments somehow affect Turkey. Hence, the re-election of President Bush seems to have been received with ambivalence and guarded optimism among the Turkish elites--and with the full disgust of the Turkish masses, who have shown their disapproval of President Bush at every opportunity since 2003.

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- Published 2/12/2004 (c) bitterlemons-international.org. Used here with permission.

Ersin Kalaycioglu is professor of political science at Sabanci University, Istanbul. He specializes in comparative politics, and particularly political representation and participation.