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No excuse for optimistic delusion
by Ali Jarbawi
In politics there is a vast difference between the ability to influence the policy-making process and simply hoping for change. At the moment, that difference is grossly in evidence with regard to the position of some Palestinian and Arab circles toward the re-election of George W. Bush. Over the past four years, these circles have suffered tremendously from Bush's policies in the region, his unquestioned support for Israel, his war on Iraq, and the ramifications of the so-called war on terrorism. However, they have never actively stood up to these policies. Rather, they meekly waited in, as it turned out, the vain hope that Bush would not win a second term.
After Tuesday's vote, these people will now cling to the possibility that changes will nevertheless occur over the next four years. This wishful thinking is based on the assumption that, in his second term, the US president will be free of the pressures from special interest lobbies and influential electoral groups whose votes he no longer needs. As such, some people argue that Israel's influence on President Bush will decrease along with the influence of the pro-Israel lobbies. This, they reason, will ultimately lead to him taking on more positive and balanced policies, especially when it comes to a political settlement and the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable Palestinian state on the 1967 borders. As evidence of the validity of their theory, such people point to the concerns and fears expressed by Israeli circles in this regard
It would be a terrible mistake, however, to resort to such a superficial argument. It is true that Bush could free himself from electoral pressures in his second term, but this depends on his desire to do so. Hence, the question remains: does Bush really want to change his policies?
The answer, in my opinion, is a resounding no. There are three reasons for this. First, Bush's perspective in his policies toward the region in general and Israel and the Palestinian cause in particular are guided by ideological and religious beliefs and not only political and interest-based politics. This ideological vision springs from the convictions of the American right, particularly the neo-conservatives, and will continue to determine America's policies toward the region.
Second, Israel has become an integral part of domestic rather than foreign policy in the United States, and Israel enjoys wide popular support. Hence policy decisions are made not only in the White House but also in Congress, and any American president or even a presidential candidate cannot afford--even if he wanted to--not to take this into consideration.
Third, in order for there to be any radical change in American policies toward the Arab region in general and the Palestinian case in particular the total absence of any Arab effort in applying pressure on Washington must be rectified. The Arab effort in this regard has been reduced to a matter of pleading. Pleading is evidence of weakness and will not change any policies. On the contrary, it only invites exploitation.
Having said that there will be no change in Bush's policies toward the region and the Palestinian cause during his second term, however, does not mean there will be no action toward a political settlement behind the scenes. On the contrary, Bush is very interested in this especially since Israel has a stake in it and given that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon wants his withdrawal plan from Gaza to be a success. Sharon's interest lies in his desire to determine the form of any Palestinian state according to Israeli interests.
In addition, Bush's allies, Britain in particular, want to mend American-European relations and they want to address the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as the reckless policy toward Iraq and the Arab region in general. In this regard, the US may push for a political settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to appease its European allies, especially since both Washington and Israel believe that the absence of President Arafat from the political scene will open the door for a Palestinian acceptance of a minimal settlement.
However, those Palestinians and Arabs who express optimism in this regard should prepare themselves for tremendous pressure to accept a settlement according to Israeli conditions, which would grant them only a nominal "state" with limited "autonomy." If these people expect Bush to pressure Israel into accepting the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, they will remain what they always have been--delusional.
- Published 8/11/2004 (c) bitterlemons.org
Ali Jarbawi is a professor of political science at Ramallah's Birzeit University.
